| Document ID |
Author |
Month, Year |
Title |
|---|
| 0057 |
USA |
2.2004 |
Bioshield Act Legislature |
| 0055 |
Council of Europe: Parliamentary Assembly |
3.2010 |
Memorandum: The handling of the H1N1 pandemic: more transparency needed |
| 0056 |
Council of Europe: Parliamentary Assembly |
3.2010 |
The handling of the H1N1 pandemic: more transparency needed |
| 0058 |
EVM |
3.2010 |
European Vaccine Manufacturers statement on Council of Europe resolution on “The handling of the H1N1 pandemic: more transparency needed” |
| 0001 |
Fouchier |
3.2011 |
Cross-protective immunity against influenza pH1N1 2009 viruses induced by seasonal influenza A (H3N2) virus is mediated by virus-specific T-cells |
| 0002 |
Sorell |
8.2011 |
Predicting ‘airborne’ influenza viruses: (trans-) mission impossible? |
| 0003 |
ESWI |
9.2011 |
ESWI News Letter 9/11-14/2011 |
| 0004 |
Harmon |
9.2011 |
What Will the Next Influenza Pandemic Look Like? |
| 0005 |
MacKenzie
|
9.2011
|
Five easy mutations to make bird flu a lethal pandemic |
0008
|
Enserink
|
11.2011
|
Scientists Brace for Media Storm Around controversial Flu studies |
0007
|
MacKenzie
|
11.2011
|
Bioterror fears could block crucial flu research |
0006
|
WHO
|
11.2011
|
WHO Concerned that new H5N1 influenza research could undermine the 2011 Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework |
0012
|
Fauci
|
12.2011
|
A Flu Virus Risk Worth Taking |
0009
|
Garrett |
12.2011
|
The Bioterrorist Next Door |
0010
|
Ingelsby
|
12.2011
|
The Risk of Engineering Highly Transmissible H5N1 Virus |
0011
|
NSABB
|
12.2011
|
Press Statement on the NSABB Review of H5N1 Research |
| 0020 |
Enserink
|
1.2012
|
Flu Researcher Ron Fouchier: 'It's a Pity That It Has Come to This' |
| 0018 |
Fouchier
|
1.2012
|
Restricted Data on Influenza H5N1 Virus Transmission |
0019
|
Fouchier
|
1.2012
|
Pause on Avian Flu Transmission Research |
0022
|
Fouchier
|
1.2012
|
Interview with Ron Fouchier |
0013
|
Garrett
|
1.2012
|
Flu Season |
0021
|
Kawaoka
|
1.2012
|
Flu transmission work is urgent |
0023
|
NSABB |
1.2012
|
Adaptations of Avian Flu are Cause for Concern |
0014
|
NYT
|
1.2012
|
An Engineered Doomsday |
0017
|
Osterholm
|
1.2012
|
Life Sciences at a Crossroads: Respiratory Transmissible H5N1 |
0016
|
Palese
|
1.2012
|
Don't censor life-saving science |
0015
|
Racaniello
|
1.2012
|
Science Should Be in the Public Domain |
0024
|
Webster
|
1.2012
|
Mammalian Transmissible H5N1 Influenza: The Dilemma of Dual-Use Research |
0025
|
Butler
|
2.2012
|
Death-rate row blurs mutant flu debate |
0029
|
Cohen
|
2.2012
|
Surprising Twist in Debate Over Lab-Made H5N1 |
0030
|
LAT
|
2.2012
|
NSC wants to rule on research that could lead to biological weapons |
0028
|
Osterholm
|
2.2012
|
Mammalian Transmissible H5N1 Influenza: Facts and Perspective |
0027
|
Palese
|
2.2012
|
H5N1 Influenza: Facts, not Fear |
0026
|
WHO
|
2.2012
|
Report on technical consultation on H5N1 research issues |
0032
|
Cohen
|
3.2012
|
NSABB Members React to Request for Second Look at H5N1 Flu Studies |
0031
|
Malakoff
|
3.2012
|
Senior US Lawmaker Leaps into H5N1 Flu Controversy |
0033
|
NSABB
|
3.2012
|
March 29-30, 2012 Meeting of the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity to Review Revised Manuscripts on Transmissibility of A/H5N1 Influenza Virus |
0034
|
USA
|
3.2012
|
United States Government Policy for Oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use Research of Concern |
0038
|
Ingelsby
|
4.2012
|
Biosecurity the Risk of Dual-Use Research: Testimony of Tom Ingelsby |
0036
|
NYT
|
4.2012
|
The Latest on the Doomsday Virus |
0035
|
Osterholm
|
4.2012
|
Open letter to Amy Patterson |
0037
|
Patterson
|
4.2012
|
Open Letter to Michael Osterholm |
0059
|
Nature
|
3.2012
|
Framework for Assessing the Risks and Benefits of Communicating Dual Use Information That May Have Biosecurity Implications |
0040
|
Brent
|
5.2012
|
Development of biological technology: Where the H5N1 flu story fits, and thoughts for after |
0041
|
Kawaoka
|
5.2012
|
Experimental adaptation of an influenza H5 HA confers respiratory droplet transmission to a reassortant H5 HA/H1N1 virus in ferrets |
0039
|
NAS
|
5.2012
|
Issues Raised, Lessons Learned, and Paths Forward for Dual-Use Research in the Life Sciences: The H5N1 Research Controversy |
0060
|
Maher
|
5.2012
|
The Biosecurity Oversight |
0052
|
WHO |
5.2012
|
WHO Activities Following 16-17 2012 Technical Consultation Meeting |
0050
|
Enserink
|
6.2012
|
For Young Scientists, A Wild Ride |
0051
|
Enserink
|
6.2012
|
Public at last, H5N1 study offers insight into virus's possible path to pandemic |
0043
|
Fauci
|
6.2012
|
Benefits and Risks of Influenza Research: Lessons Learned |
0042
|
Fouchier
|
6.2012
|
Airborne Transmission of Influenza A/H5N1 Virus Between Ferrets |
0044
|
Frankel
|
6.2012
|
Regulating the Boundaries of Dual-Use Research |
0049
|
Malakoff
|
6.2012
|
How Much Longer Will Moratorium Last |
0047
|
Rapuolli
|
6.2012
|
Influenza: Options to Improve Pandemic Preparation |
0046
|
Schneier
|
6.2012
|
Securing Medical Research a Cyber Security Point of View |
0048
|
Trevan
|
6.2012
|
Do not censor science in the name of biosecurity |
0045
|
Wolinetz
|
6.2012
|
Implementing the New U.S. Dual-Use Policy |
0053
|
Connor |
7.2012
|
Experts Condemn Plan to Lift Ban on Research into Deadly H5N1 Bird Flu Virus |
0054
|
Greenfieldboyce
|
7.2012
|
Bird Flu Researchers to Meet About Research Moratorium |
0061
|
Connor
|
8.2012
|
Scientists call for a longer ban on bird flu research |
